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The Canadian dairy industry received the most unwanted of all presents just prior to Christmas 
2002- a clear loss on the dairy export issue upon final WTO appeal.  This leaves the Canadian 
dairy industry with protracted challenges if it is to grow in the future.  It appears to be the final 
chapter in the long running WTO-Canadian dairy export saga, which we first analyzed in a 
George Morris Centre Special Report about 3 years ago
1.  Now the challenges associated with 
the implications of the WTO decision must be faced. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to outline the basic points advanced by Canada, and by New Zealand 
and the US in the WTO appeal, and to illustrate the importance of the WTO decision in the 
context of growth in the Canadian dairy industry.  Finally, the apparent challenges laid down by 
the WTO decision are analyzed in the context of needs for new marketing research to reform the 
milk marketing system. 
 
The WTO Dairy Export Case: How We Got Here 
 
The WTO case against Canadian dairy exports goes back at least four years.  New Zealand and 
the US complained that Canadian dairy exports sold through the “special export milk classes” 
(specifically, milk pricing classes 5 (d) and (e)) were implicitly export subsidies, and that Canada 
had exceeded its allowed levels of subsidized dairy exports under the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture.  In May, 1999, the panel convened to hear the case under the WTO dispute 
settlement body found in favour of the complainants (New Zealand and the US)
2.  Canada 
appealed the decision, and lost on appeal in a decision by a WTO appellate body in December, 
1999
3.  Subsequent to the appeal loss, the Canadian dairy export system was reformed.  New 
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Zealand and the US challenged the compliance of the Canadian dairy export system to the WTO.  
In July, 2001, a WTO panel found that the new Canadian dairy export system constituted an 
export subsidy
4.  Canada appealed that decision, and in December 2001, the WTO appellate 
body supported the Canadian position and found that the reformed Canadian dairy export system 
was not an export subsidy
5.   
 
In late 2001, the US and New Zealand requested that the original panel investigate the WTO 
legality of the reformed Canadian dairy export system
6.  The original panel ruled that the 
reformed Canadian export milk system constituted an export subsidy, and that Canada had 
violated its subsidized export levels under the Agreement on Agriculture.  It is the appeal of this 
decision that was released in December, 2002
7    
 
The December 2002 WTO Decision 
 
The WTO appellate panel that released its decision in December 2002 clarified two crucial issues 
in the dairy export case against Canada.  The first relates to the benchmark used to establish 
whether a two-price system is truly in place.  Canada had successfully argued earlier in the 
debate that production cost could be used as a yardstick against which to measure export prices, 
rather than the domestic price.  In other words, Canada conceded that Canadian export prices 
were lower than domestic milk prices, but argued they were not below the production cost of 
exporting producers.  The US and New Zealand argued that the appropriate measure of 
production costs had to be an industry average, and that it must include returns to invested 
capital and owners’ unpaid labour.  Canada argued that only the production costs of producers 
that actually export were relevant, and that non-cash overhead costs (such as return to invested 
capital and owners’ unpaid labour) should be excluded.   
 
The panel rejected the Canadian argument that only the costs of exporting producers mattered; 
they determined that industry average costs were the relevant benchmark.  Rather than address 
the issue of overhead costs directly, the panel chose to compare actual export prices received by 
Canadian producers with production costs as proposed under the Canadian argument.  The 
observation the panel made was that export prices were lower than the Canadian proposal for 
production costs.  Thus, given that export sales were made at a loss relative to the lower of the 
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two production cost benchmark proposals, the panel reasoned that the export sales must have 
been financed from elsewhere- i.e. from domestic sales. 
 
Secondly, the panel was very clear about the relationship between government intervention, 
domestic milk pricing, and the financing exports.  The panel found the Canadian Dairy 
Commission, as an instrument of government, set minimum domestic prices for butter and skim 
milk powder, which effectively determined the domestic milk price.  Since under either of the 
Canadian or US/New Zealand production cost proposals, export milk was produced at a loss, the 
loss must be financed (or pooled against) milk sold profitably in the domestic market.  Thus, 
since domestic sales are required to finance export sales, and domestic prices are due to 
government intervention, then effectively exports occur due to government intervention.  
 
Implications for the Canadian Dairy Industry   
 
On the surface, it may appear that this decision is not a big deal.  The WTO decision will prevent 
Canada from exporting above WTO subsidized export levels fixed in the Agreement on 
Agriculture in 1994.  Since the panel demonstrated that under either conception of production 
costs presented, export sales occur at a loss, then the decision prevents Canadian farmers from 
incurring further self-injury by exporting at a loss.  If this were true, Canada should be thanking 
the US and New Zealand for bringing this to our attention.  However, dairy exports actually 
occur at marginal cost, with overhead costs typically covered through domestic milk sales, so 
exports can be marginally profitable for farmers.  
 
At a broader level, this dairy export decision presents a crucial challenge to the Canadian dairy 
industry.  This is due to the following: 
•  Increases in dairy exports have vaulted Canada well ahead of the levels agreed to in WTO for 
subsidized exports.  This is shown in Table 1.  The Canadian dairy industry appears to have 
adapted itself to growth through cheese and “other product” exports at well above WTO 
authorized levels.  Canadian exports are currently around 200% of committed levels in 
cheese and other products. This trend is less consistent in butter and skim milk powder; 
however, Canada has periodically exceeded subsidized export levels in these products by a 
significant margin as well.  As a result of the WTO decision, export volumes must fall to the 
subsidized export levels defined in Table 1, which will amount to a loss of half the export 
volume in cheese and other products.  
•  The budget for milk procurement on behalf of processors comes from product sales and 
earnings.  This is true regardless of the structure of regulated prices that occur under supply 
management.  For many plants, the dramatic reduction in dairy exports that could occur as a 
result of the WTO decision will reduce plant volumes which will, in turn, reduce processor 
sales and profits
8.  The ultimate result will be a decreased incentive to invest (or reinvest) in 
dairy processing, plant consolidation and rationalization, and a decreased willingness to 
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Butter        
 95/96  9,464 13,956 147.5 
 96/97  8,271 10,987 132.8 
 97/98  7,079 10,894 153.9 
 98/99  5,886 4,327 73.5 
 99/00  4,693 1,803 38.4 
 00/01  3,500 808 23.1 
 01/02  3,500 1,501 42.9 
Cheese        
 95/96  12,448 13,751 110.5 
 96/97  11,773 20,409 173.4 
 97/98  11,099 27,397 246.8 
 98/99  10,424 26,027 249.7 
 99/00  9,750 20,480 210.1 
 00/01  9,076 17,945 197.7 
 01/02  9,076 14,445 159.2 
SMP        
 95/96  54,910 35,252 64.2 
 96/97  52,919 24,888 47.0 
 97/98  50,927 29,886 58.7 
 98/99  48,936 40,728 83.2 
 99/00  46,944 39,061 83.2 
 00/01  44,953 41,197 91.6 
 01/02  44,953 52,294 116.3 
       
Other Milk 
Products      
 95/96  36,990 37,573 101.6 
 96/97  35,649 62,146 174.3 
 97/98  34,307 71,023 207.0 
 98/99  32,966 46,630 141.4 
 99/00*  31,624 57,058 180.4 
 00/01*  30,282 63,794 210.7 
 01/02*  30,282 60,721 200.5 
 
Source: WTO Agreement on Agriculture and Statistics Canada, Agriculture Division, Livestock Section, 
Dairy/Food Unit  6
purchase milk at regulated prices.  Either way, the demand for within-quota milk (as well as 
export milk) is apt to decrease.  As this occurs, over time, there will be a greater resistance to 
milk price increases, and it may become difficult to retain historic milk price levels.  The 
logical result of long-run weakened processor demand is that farm milk prices must fall, or 
the commitment to support prices will have to be increased. 
•  Market growth is a difficult challenge for supply management.  Some even view market 
growth as being in conflict with the concept of supply management.  However, in any 
industry, there are fundamental reasons why growth is critical: 
  Assets employed in the industry tend to be priced (capitalized) given 
current and future expectations of gross margins. 
  Because expected returns effectively determine the price of assets, in order 
to generate a profitable return on them, growth in gross margins is 
required 
  To induce new investment, returns on investment in dairy assets must be 
competitive with those in other farm and non-farm enterprises. 
•  Milk price increases provide growth for the farm sector, but it must be shared through 
increases in processor revenue if growth is to be sustainable.  Also, price increases are 
transparent, and thus are readily capitalized into higher quota values. . 
•  Decreases in unit production cost create growth, but without the ability to expand volume, 
they too tend also to be readily capitalized into quota values.      
•  Meaningful growth occurs with increases in volume at stable or only slightly decreasing 
prices.  Such growth has no obvious bias on quota values, and allows farmers and processors 
to leverage the scale economies evident in the dairy industry. 
 
Growth in volume and sales will drive profitability and new investment in the dairy industry; 
however: 
•  The domestic market for dairy products in Canada is largely mature.  This is demonstrated in 
Figure 1 below.  The only significant source of growth in the industry has been in variety and 
cheddar cheeses.  In recent years, even its growth has slowed, making manufactured dairy 
products a mature market. 
•  The market for fluid milk is also largely mature.  Figure 2 shows that while there has been 
some growth in the fluid milk market since 1997/98, it has been at best slow.  In all 
likelihood, future growth in the fluid market will be limited to increases in the Canadian 
population. 
•  At the same time, there has been a significant increase in the production of milk for export.  
This has occurred despite the interruptions that occurred in response to the WTO rulings. To 
illustrate, Figure 3 presents the volumes of total milk production sold for export relative to 
total milk production (export and domestic) for Ontario.  For the early part of the period, the 
export volumes shown are the volumes shipped under Class 5 (d) and (e) relative to total 
production in the supply management system; from August 2000 onward, they reflect 
volumes in Class 5(d) plus the volume sold through the export contract exchange relative to 
total production within the supply management system plus the volume moved through the 
export contract system.  The figure shows a steady increase in milk volumes, despite a high 
degree of seasonality.  What is surprising is that in Ontario, exports have grown to be 
commonly 10% of total milk production, and periodically 15% or more of total production. 
     7
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Source: Canadian Dairy Commission, milk volumes in Classes 1(a), (b), (c), and (d) 
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Thus, based on the foregoing, the prospects for meaningful growth in the domestic dairy market 
are dubious.  However, Canada has been successful in achieving growth through exports.  The 
loss of export growth thus stifles the most promising source of growth to attract new capital into 
the dairy industry.  Export sales have expanded to the point that if we must now backslide on 
exports down to WTO subsidized export levels, the Canadian dairy industry will shrink. 
 
Canada’s Options for Reform  
 
What appears clear is that exports have been critical to dairy industry growth.  What is less clear 
is what Canada must do to bring the milk marketing system into final compliance with the WTO 
decision so that exports can resume.  The following themes mentioned in the most recent and 
previous panel decisions appear to make the job of redesigning dairy supply management 
difficult: 
•  The WTO panels have made clear that government “payments” that facilitate separate 
domestic and export prices need not occur in the form of cash.  Apparently, delegation of 
regulatory authority to implement a two-price system, or foregoing domestic revenue in 
favour of export sales through regulatory measures can constitute a government payment. 
•  Total cost of production has been established as the relevant benchmark in evaluating the 
legality of a two-price domestic-export marketing system.  Allocation of production costs 
toward the higher of the two prices in order to cross-subsidize the lower one can be regarded 
as an export subsidy, if the two-price system is maintained by statute (and it literally always 
is). 
•  The WTO panels have devoted significant attention to whether processors would otherwise 
have access to milk competitively priced on the world market but for government action.  If 
product is priced contingent on export, this criterion is clearly met.  However, one can only 
speculate that managing the domestic supply would be extremely difficult if product priced 
for the export market were not contingent on export and could flow back into the domestic 
market. 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
The implications of WTO dairy decision may not be limited to the Canadian dairy industry.  
Other products in Canada, and many agricultural marketing systems around the world, use two-
price systems in which the domestic market is priced higher than the export market, with 
provisions to prevent low-priced exports from flowing back into the domestic market.  In all 
likelihood, the complainants that brought about the challenge against Canada (the US and New 
Zealand) have programs with these characteristics themselves.  If so, their efforts in the dairy 
case may backfire, and Canada would be justified in highlighting and prosecuting cases against 
products marketed under these systems to their fullest extent under WTO.  Alternatively, Canada 
can make the case that the existing definition of export subsidies is simply unworkable given the 
apparent broad implications of the dairy export ruling, and that it must be renegotiated in the 
Doha Round.  
 
Canada has a tremendous vested interest in protecting supply management in the dairy industry.  
Literally billions of dollars in quota and farm equity are at stake.  At the same time, the Canadian 
dairy industry must be able to grow or it will shrink, its productive assets will be deteriorated,   11
and it will eventually implode.  This is the same conclusion we reached in our analysis of the 
dairy export issue three years ago.  
 
In order to avoid a conflict between supply management and growth through exports,  
Canada needs to fundamentally rethink the milk pricing system within supply management.  
Research is now urgently needed which can address the following marketing challenges: 
•  The apparent need to minimize or eliminate government action (as defined under the WTO 
decision) in domestic price determination  
•  The apparent need to maintain domestic market revenue as separate and independent from 
export revenue (i.e. prevention of pooling and cross-subsidization) 
•  The need to export in the absence of a pricing system that gives export prices as contingent 
upon export, while maintaining a higher domestic price.  
 
The Canadian dairy industry faces protracted challenges if it is to continue to grow through 
exports.  Given the constraints imposed by the WTO decision, the entire pricing and marketing 
system will probably need to be reconsidered, along with a broad discussion of how supply 
management can be maintained and facilitate growth and exports.  The evidence presented above 
says that intensive effort and a willingness to place everything up for analysis is warranted to 
solve this problem.  This will likely prove to be the greatest challenge faced by dairy supply 
management in the last thirty years. 
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